Can animals, and especially cattle, be the subject ofmoral concern? Should we care about their well-being?Two competing ethical theories have addressed suchissues so far. A utilitarian theory which, inBentham's wake, extends moral consideration to everysentient being, and a theory of the rights orinterests of animals which follows Feinberg'sconceptions. This includes various positions rangingfrom the most radical (about animal liberation) tomore moderate ones (concerned with the well-being ofanimals). Notwithstanding their diversity, theseconceptions share some common flaws. First, as anextension of primarily anthropocentric (...) theories (aboututility or rights) they still participate in the flawsof the original setting. Second, extending them tonon-human beings raises the problem of the borderwhich is to be drawn between what can be included inthe purview of moral consideration and what is leftoutside. Third, such theories are not able to distinguishbetween an ethics of wildlife and an ethics ofdomestic life, which too often leads to preposterousstatements. We would like to argue (i) that we should distinguishbetween environmental ethics (concerned withpopulations, species, biotic communities) and animalethics (where animals are taken into consideration individually);(ii) that individualist animal ethics are not relevantfor animal rearing; (iii) that animal rearing is a hierarchicalrelationship which rules are to be found in the fiction of a domesticcontract.Hence, we would like to construct a new conception ofthe ethics of the relation between men and the cattlethey breed based on the idea of a domestic contract.Our main assumption is Mary Midgleys's anthropologicalassumption, according to which human communities,since the Neolithic age, have always included variousanimals, so that relations of sociability have alwaysexisted between human beings and animals within thedomestic community (a mixed community). In order tospecify the hierarchical and non-egalitarian, butinclusive reciprocal obligations and relations insidesuch a community, we will elaborate on the notion ofa ``domestic contract'', an implicitly assumedidea traced back to Lucretius and whichwe will follow up to the physiocrats and Adam Smith.We will show that such an idea relies upon theassumption of communication between cattle farmer andanimals, of shared experience and exchanges betweenthe two parties. We will then show how modern factory,or battery animal farming, can be seen as unilaterallybreaking this domestic contract, forsaking ourduties towards domestic animals. (shrink)

This paper explores and discusses the various meanings of the stewardship concept in the field of sustainability science. We highlight the increasing differences between alternative approaches to stewardship and propose a typology to enable scientists and practitioners to more precisely identify the basis and objectives of the concept of stewardship. We first present the two dimensions we used to map the diversity of stances concerning stewardship. Second, we analyse these positions in relation to the limits of the systemic approach, ideological (...) manipulation, responsibility, and solidarity. In the final section we explain how the concept of ecological solidarity, a core principal in recent French law on biodiversity conservation and national park governance can contribute to the underpinning of a specific form of social-ecological stewardship. (shrink)

Context: In most jurisdictions where medical-aid-in-dying is available, this option is reserved for individuals suffering from incurable physical conditions. Currently, in Canada, people who have a mental illness are legally excluded from accessing MAiD. Methods: We developed a questionnaire for mental health care providers to better understand their perspectives related to ethical issues in relation to MAiD in the context of severe and persistent suffering caused by mental illness. We used a mixed-methods survey approach, using a concurrent embedded model with (...) both closed and open-ended questions. Findings: 477 healthcare providers from the province of Québec completed the questionnaire. One third of the sample were nurses, one quarter psychologists and one quarter psycho-educators. Nearly half of the respondents considered that people with a severe mental illness should be granted the right to opt for MAiD as a way to end their suffering. Respondents were more likely to feel comfortable listening to the person and participating in discussions related to MAiD for a mental illness than offering care or the means for the person to access MAiD. Most reported that they had not received adequate/sufficient training, education or preparation in order to address ethical questions surrounding MAiD. Conclusions: The findings highlight how extending MAiD to people with a mental illness would affect daily practices for mental healthcare providers who work directly with people who may request MAiD. The survey results also reinforce the need for adequate training and professional education in this complex area of care. (shrink)

Moral or ethical questions are vital because they affect our daily lives: what is the best choice we can make, the best action to take in a given situation, and ultimately, the best way to live our lives? Health ethics has contributed to moving ethics toward a more experience-based and user-oriented theoretical and methodological stance but remains in our practice an incomplete lever for human development and flourishing. This context led us to envision and develop the stance of a “living (...) ethics”, described in this inaugural collective and programmatic paper as an effort to consolidate creative collaboration between a wide array of stakeholders. We engaged in a participatory discussion and collective writing process known as instrumentalist concept analysis. This process included initial local consultations, an exploratory literature review, the constitution of a working group of 21 co-authors, and 8 workshops supporting a collaborative thinking and writing process. First, a living ethics designates a stance attentive to human experience and the role played by morality in human existence. Second, a living ethics represents an ongoing effort to interrogate and scrutinize our moral experiences to facilitate adaptation of people and contexts. It promotes the active and inclusive engagement of both individuals and communities in envisioning and enacting scenarios which correspond to their flourishing as authentic ethical agents. Living ethics encourages meaningful participation of stakeholders because moral questions touch deeply upon who we are and who we want to be. We explain various aspects of a living ethics stance, including its theoretical, methodological, and practical implications as well as some barriers to its enactment based on the reflections resulting from the collaborative thinking and writing process. (shrink)

Should we understand the biological philosophy of Hans Jonas as a phenomenology for unveiling the phenomenon of life or as a kind of Hegelian metaphysics that presents life as a substantial principle? To answer that question, we need to deal first with the question of our access to other living beings and then with the problem of the spiritualization of the concept of evolution. This article will use an essay called “Organism and Freedom: An Essay in Philosophical Biology.”.

Living labs are interdisciplinary and participatory initiatives aimed at bringing research closer to practice by involving stakeholders in all stages of research. Living labs align with the principles of participatory research methods as well as recent insights about how participatory ways of generating knowledge help to change practices in concrete settings with respect to specific problems. The participatory, open, and discussion‐oriented nature of living labs could be ideally suited to accompany ethical reflection and changes ensuing from reflection. To our knowledge, (...) living labs have not been explicitly trialed and reported in ethics literature. In this discussion paper, we report and discuss four initial issues that marked the process of setting up a living lab in ethics: (1) determining the goals and expected outcomes of an ethics living lab; (2) establishing operational procedures; (3) selecting communities and defining pilot projects; and (4) adopting a lens to tackle emerging questions and challenges. We explain these four issues and present the paths taken based on the novel and specific orientation, that is, living ethics, at the basis of this project. In alignment with living ethics and É‐LABO, we approach challenges as learning opportunities to ask not only “how” questions but also “why” questions. We hope that this discussion paper informed by our experience helps to clarify the theoretical, methodological, and practical approaches necessary to successfully adopt and employ living labs in ethics. (shrink)

Planteamos el problema del aparecer de la hylè husserliana, lo que nos conduce al problema de la auto-donación de la vida como condición de una fenomenología de la percepción. Para solucionar este problema, establecemos las condiciones de un diálogo entre Michel Henry, que pone énfasis sobre la auto-afección de la vida inmanente, y Merleau-Ponty, que privilegia una concepción intencional del cuerpo mundano. Tal diálogo nos permite identificar un prejuicio común, cuya superación podría ofrecer la posibilidad de una solución al problema (...) del aparecer sensible desde la vida. (shrink)

Comment répondre à la crise environnementale et aux menaces qu’elle fait peser sur la poursuite de notre mode de vie? Devons-nous mobiliser nos forces pour lutter contre la crise, changer radicalement nos comportements? Ne faudrait-il pas plutôt veiller à nous adapter à une situation transformée? Ces deux pôles sont présents dans les politiques environnementales. Pour répondre au changement climatique on envisage à la fois des politiques d’atténuation (mitigation) des émissions de gaz à ef...

Résumé Cet article se propose de proposer les conditions d’une confrontation entre la phénoménologie de la donation de Jean-Luc Marion et l’ontologie de la vie de Renaud Barbaras. Cela suppose d’établir un certain plan de convergence à propos du projet d’une description de l’apparaître pur, de la méthode et de la conception “événementiale” du phénomène et du sujet afin de faire valoir une divergence quant à la question de la naissance transcendantale du sujet.This paper aims at giving the conditions of (...) a confrontation between the phenomenology of the givenness of Jean-Luc Marion and the ontology of life of Renaud Barbaras. The project of the description of the appearing as such, the method, the “evential” conception of the phenomenon and the subject may constitute a plane of convergence previous to putting emphasis on a divergence between them about the question of the transcendental birth of the subject. (shrink)

Jan Patočka holds that both the Husserlian and the Heideggerian descriptions of history remain abstract because they lack an authentic reflection on historical sense’s appearing, which presupposes a description of the transition from the nonhistorical and prehistorical states of humanity to its final historical state. Nevertheless, it seems that Patočka would confront an internal aporia here because, even if he sought to think the continuity of these three movements, he tends to affirm the rupture between them. To overcome that aporia, (...) it becomes necessary to formulate the hypothesis according to which the prehistorical is characterized by a repression of sense’s problematic character, whereas the historical as such is characterized by a conversion of consciousness toward this problematic character. Justifying this hypothesis requires exploring Patočka’s anthropology, confronting it with Arendt’s anthropology, and formulating metaphysical perspectives. (shrink)

This paper aims at understanding why Rousseau excluded women from citizenship. Citizenship, for Rousseau, is not a matter of right, not even a matter of behaviour (of how to behave individually to be a good citizen). It is a matter of social condition. How should society be constituted so that there can be citizens? The answer to this question is that there must be women in the private sphere so that there can be citizen in the public sphere. The paper (...) begins with Montesquieu's model of the republican condition of women, considers the way Rousseau updated this model, and concludes with the idea, that much more than the male figure of citizenship (which remains a stereotype), the woman, in Rousseau, is the true figure of modernity. (shrink)

Este artículo quiere mostrar hasta qué punto se pueden acercar los proyectos fenomenológicos de Jan Patočka y Michel Henry explorando su pretensión común al describir el aparecer como tal. Más allá de lo que nos aparece como un plano de convergencia entre ambos pensamientos, queremos también enfatizar los puntos de divergencia y las aporías distintas que ellos conllevan, ver cómo se podría empezar a superarlas e iniciar un posible diálogo entre ambos autores.

La dimension politique du scepticisme, considère-t-on souvent, c'est le conformisme. Mais la séparation entre le domaine intérieur et l'espace public n'a pas pour seule conséquence l'injonction de suivre la coutume. Elle est d'abord constitution du domaine privé, qui est un lieu de liberté, à l'écart de la foule et du pouvoir. Cela permet de mieux comprendre la position sceptique en politique: le conseil du prince, en secret et en retrait de l'éclat public. Cela permet surtout de comprendre ce qu'apporte le (...) scepticisme aux conceptions modernes de la liberté: un modèle social de la libre poursuite de la vérité. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre and Jan Patočka claim to go beneath the phenomenal correlation between the subject and the world discovered by Husserl in order to account for it from a more fundamental plane. Their going below the “universal a priori of correlation” allows them to describe it more thoroughly. But we wish to show that Sartre’s description remains dependent on a philosophical realism which prevents him from accounting for the genesis of the correlation. Patočka, however, achieves just this thanks to his (...) conception of an originary appearing. To verify this thesis, we will investigate the status of the body in both authors, so far as a successful account of the body should ensure the connection between the original plane and the openness to the world characteristic of the subject. Recognizing this function in the body, we ask if either Sartre’s or Patočka’s philosophy grants to the body the place it deserves and suggest that only Patočka achieves this, while Sartre is prevented from doing so by his realism. (shrink)

Para além do fato de comungarem as suspeitas contra os desenvolvimentos modernos da técnica e os riscos que eles representam para o mundo humano, Hans Jonas e Hannah Arendt se distanciam quanto às condições que permitiriam preservar um tal mundo. O primeiro nos convida a desenvolver uma ética da responsabilidade para com a vida enquanto a segunda desenha uma política da ação humana que escapa do ciclo vital. A constatação dessa divergência serve, no entanto, de pretexto para pensarmos uma complementaridade: (...) a natalidade arendtiana pode receber uma justificação bioontológica e a ética jonasiana pode encontrar um modo de encarnação política na filosofia de Hannah Arendt. (shrink)

In the care of patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC), some ethical difficulties stem from the challenges of accurate diagnosis and the uncertainty of prognosis. Current neuroimaging research on these disorders could eventually improve the accuracy of diagnoses and prognoses and therefore change the context of end-of-life decision making. However, the perspective of healthcare professionals on these disorders remains poorly understood and may constitute an obstacle to the integration of research. We conducted a qualitative study involving healthcare professionals from an (...) acute care university medical center. A short questionnaire captured demographic data as well as the experience of participants with DOC patients. A semi-structured interview was used to explore attitudes toward ethical issues identified in a previous literature review. Qualitative content analysis of interviews was conducted with the NVivo software. Accurate diagnosis among DOC is often regarded as a challenge, but this was generally not the case for our participants because most reported high confidence in DOC diagnoses. However, participants reported struggling with prognosis, especially because of its essential role for end-of-life decision making and communication with families. Variability of opinion between healthcare professionals was reported and identified by some as a minor issue while others stressed how families struggle with different medical opinions. End-of-life decision making encompassed a large proportion of ethical challenges in these patients, and the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration created significant discomfort in a minority of participants. The concept of futility was subject to wide-ranging understandings with both favorable and unfavorable opinions. Our data suggest that to ensure the incorporation of new evidence-based advances, attention should be directed to the real-world practices and challenges of accurate diagnosis and prognosis. Given pervasive challenges in end-of-life care, we recommend improved training of healthcare professionals in the care of patients with DOC, particularly in end-of life care, understanding the context of decision making, and determining how to optimally integrate new neuroscience research on the care of patients with DOC. (shrink)

Renaud Barbaras wants to show that only the concept of life can help us understand how the subject may be a condition as well as a part of the world. The failures of the former phenomenological theories on this point is due to “the ontology of death” they assume, which leads to separate the conscience and the body. It is thus required to realise an epochè of death so as to think the unity of the subject. Ultimately, Renaud Barbaras is (...) led to define life from desire. (shrink)

“Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life on Earth.” How can we understand Jonas’ “maxim”? Is it too anthropocentric to be of any interest for an environmental ethic? Is is too limited to survival to have a moral signification in a truly human ethic? One can argue first that it is not so much anti-Kantian than that it challenges the current prevailing “presentism” and obliges us to take into consideration not (...) only future generations, but also the context in which one anticipates these future generations to be living. Therefore, we can distinguish two different interpretations of Jonas’ maxim: in a first stage, that of sustainable development, it was understood as taking into consideration not only the needs but also the rights of future generations; in a second stage, that of an Anthropocene and ecological transition, it means that making sense of humanity implies connecting human beings to the Earth and other living beings far from opposing them. (shrink)

Why Rousseau, this modern, has much more to say about nature than most of his contemporaries? And as he speaks it? This is what we investigate, taking the issue from three relationships: the humanity with nature (in its global dimension and a first approach, metaphysics), the human societies with nature, by the technique, and, finally, the lone hiker, the independent individual.

Conçue à l’origine comme une discipline globale concernée par la survie des populations humaines dans un environnement global, la bioéthique a été finalement redéfinie comme une éthique biomédicale, particulièrement par les applications des biotechnologies aux humains. La bioéthique a-t-elle profité de ce resserrement anthropocentrique? Nous défendrons l’idée que ce n’est pas le cas après avoir examiné la question des frontières morales entre humains et non humains, celle des limites de l’application des biotechnologies aux humains pour en éviter la mécanisation, et (...) celle des définitions de la santé. (shrink)

L’émergence de l’économique doit-elle être comprise comme l’émancipation des conduites privées de la tutelle politique, ou comme la promotion publique de conduites jusque-là simplement privées, ou particulières? Confrontant le récit classiquement libéral de l’auto-affirmation de l’individu à l’analyse de la recomposition des sphères sociales (famille, économie, État) à l’époque moderne, tout en s’appuyant sur la distinction entre économie formelle et économie substantielle, l’article argumente en faveur de l’étude des sphères qui permet non seulement de rendre compte de l’articulation de l’économique (...) et du politique, mais également du statut de l’individu. (shrink)

« La liberté consiste à n'être soumis qu'aux lois»: cette idée, que Turgot attribue aux «écrivains républicains», a sans doute sa place dans la tradition républicaine. Il s'agit cependant d'une idée essentiellement moderne, et pas nécessairement républicaine, développée dans la critique de l'absolutisme: on en retient l'importance qu'il y a à faire la loi, tout en refusant que qui que ce soit puisse se placer au-dessus des lois. Montesquieu fait du gouvernement modéré, qui peut être une monarchie, le gouvernement de (...) la loi, celle-ci garantit à l'action rationnelle la prévisibilité et la constance dont elle a besoin. C'est Rousseau qui fait du gouvernement de la loi un thème républicain, en identifiant autogouvernement et autonomie. Lier la liberté à la loi, c'est insister sur l'existence politique des libertés: depuis Turgot, les libéraux y voient une menace pour les droits. (shrink)

Notre conception dualiste de la nature n’est ni universelle ni universalisable. Cependant, posant l’extériorité de ce qui est humain et de ce qui est naturel, ce dualisme s’est décliné en un certain nombre d’oppositions : nature/culture ; naturel/artificiel. On pourrait a priori considérer qu’il en est de même de l’opposition entre le sauvage et le domestique. Or, entre le sauvage et le domestique, il y a un entre-deux de milieux (ce que les Romains dénommaient le saltus ), qu’il s’agisse des (...) espaces pastoraux ou des peuplements forestiers qui ne sont plus exploités, ou encore, des friches industrielles et urbaines. C’est ce que l’on qualifie en France de « nature férale », résultat d’ensauvagements multiples. L’auteur plaide pour la libre évolution de ces milieux comme stratégie alternative de protection de la nature. (shrink)

L’attention de Montesquieu pour la diversité empirique des institutions humaines ne se comprend pas seulement dans une perspective descriptive, visant à rendre compte des faits, elle est constitutive d’un effort pour penser une évaluation circonstanciée des institutions et des lois. En examinant la pluralité des États, la pluralité des pouvoirs et des puissances sociales qui constituent l’ordre politique, et la pluralité des hommes, on verra comment l’étude des rapports menée dans L’Esprit des lois vise un « savoir de la liberté (...) ». (shrink)

La question de l’écologie est celle de la nature, mais que faut-il entendre par là? La réflexion sur ces questions a longtemps hésité entre une vision dualiste (qui définit la nature par opposition à l’homme) et une vision moniste (l’homme fait partie de la nature). L’idée générale de cet article est que l’on n’échappe pas aux impasses du dualisme en se ralliant au monisme. L’un et l’autre constituent les deux faces, difficilement séparables, du naturalisme moderne. On sort du dualisme par (...) le pluralisme : l’opposition du naturel et de l’artificiel et celle du naturel et du culturel (ou du social), que l’on confond souvent, sont distinctes. Nature, artéfact et société dessinent trois pôles, que multiplie la pluralité des cultures. C’est en les prenant tous en considération que l’on peut apprendre à bien se conduire dans la nature, sans pour autant y disparaitre. (shrink)

For approximately a quarter of a century, moral reflection has turned to a new object: the environment. Environmental ethics has emerged primarily in the United States out of considerations on Nature in the wild state - the wilderness - and the duty to preserve it. As such, it divides into two trends. The first seeks to develop a general theory of moral value, an abstract, universal principle qualifying individual entities, such that the intrinsic value of living entities deserves our respect. (...) The second, first formulated by an American forester, Aldo Leopold, is an ethics of the biotic community: how Nature can be a community of which we are members, and in within which it is possible for us to conduct ourselves well. (shrink)

“Actúa de manera tal que los efectos de tu acción sean compatibles con la permanencia de la vida humana genuina en la Tierra”. ¿Cómo podemos entender esta máxima de Jonas? ¿Es demasiado antropocéntrica como para ser interesante para la ética ambiental? ¿Está demasiado limitada a la supervivencia como para tener un significado moral en una ética verdaderamente humana? En primer lugar, podríamos argumentar que no es tan anti-kantiana como para desafiar el “presentismo” actual imperante y nos obliga a tener en (...) cuenta no solo las generaciones futuras, sino también el contexto en el que anticipamos que estas futuras generaciones vivirán. Por lo tanto, deberíamos distinguir dos interpretaciones diferentes de la máxima de Jonas. En una primera etapa, la del desarrollo sostenible, se entendió que considera no solo las necesidades sino también los derechos de las generaciones futuras. En una segunda etapa, la de un Antropoceno y una transición ecológica, significa que dar sentido a la humanidad implica conectar a los seres humanos con la Tierra y otros seres vivos en lugar de oponerse a ellos. (shrink)

Le regard jeté sur la vie souffre d’une certaine ambivalence au sein des analyses contemporaines, dans la mesure où celle-ci est tantôt présentée comme un bien fragile qu’il faut protéger et dont la prise en compte pourrait même conduire au renouvellement profond de notre culture, tantôt, au contraire, comme une menace essentielle qui mettrait en question les fondements de la civilisation humaine. D’un côté, on affirme que c’est à condition de reconnaître la vulnérabilité des vivants, y compr...

La obra de Hans Jonas tiende a ser olvidada por los filósofos de la ética ambiental. Quisiera mostrar como su Principio de Responsabilidad pueda ayudarnos a guiar el desarrollo efectivo de instituciones públicas orientadas hacia metas ambientales. Efectivamente, se puede usar el Principio de Responsabilidad para desarrollar una concepción deliberativa y ambiental de la democracia. Por ende, después de recordar unos aspectos esenciales del Principio jonasiano de Responsabilidad, tomaré en consideración sus implicaciones para el cuadro socio-contractual de la democracia deliberativa. (...) Es posible mostrar que la concepción jonasiana de la responsabilidad conduce a una concepción deliberativa y ambiental de la democracia pues permite acomodar los distintos sentidos del bien de los ciudadanos en el marco de una gobernanza global y ambiental. (shrink)

Die Rezeption, die die Arbeit von Hans Jonas in Frankreich erlebt hat, wurde hauptsächlich durch die Zeitachse der Übersetzungen seiner Bücher bestimmt. Das Prinzip Verantwortung wurde 1990 von Jean Greisch unter dem Titel Le principe responsabilité veröffentlicht und diese Übersetzung hat zweifellos das Interesse der französischen Intellektuellen für Jonas geweckt. Es ist allerdings zum Teil heftig kritisiert worden – insbesondere wegen seines kantischen Charakters gab es Diskussionen.

En décrivant le phénomène de la perception, la phénoménologie entreprend de remonter du monde où nous nous trouvons vers la source de l'apparaître, vers la conscience intentionnelle qui anime une matière sensible pure. Mais comment alors est-il possible de rendre compte de la donation de cette matière première? Une première voie consiste à se satisfaire d'une conception transcendantale de la chair qui permet un sentir pur. Une deuxième voie propose de remonter en-deçà, en direction d'un événement grâce auquel il y (...) aurait du sensible. La chair a alors pour fonction d'assurer le passage entre cette première donne du sensible et le monde tel que nous le constituons. Cette deuxième voie semble aujourd'hui privilégiée. Mais elle pose la question de savoir comment articuler les deux sens de la chair, événementiel et expressif, afin d'en éviter la déchirure. L'exploration du corps érotique permet-elle de réconcilier la chair avec elle-même pour ainsi nous livrer le secret de notre condition sensible? Telle est l'interrogation qui guide cet ouvrage, qui s'appuie sur les ressources offertes par la phénoménologie jusque dans ses développements les plus contemporains pour en éclairer les enjeux."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Le projet de Hans Jonas, et son engagement de philosophe, résulte de la prise de conscience de « l’oubli », dans l’histoire de la philosophie, de la vie. « L’ontologie de la mort », qui commande de manière sous-terraine cette histoire, mène à l’échec toute tentative pour la penser, en ramenant l’ambiguïté dont elle est le lieu, soit à la figure univoque de l’organisme étudiée par le biologiste, soit à celle du vécu ou de l’idée, exploré par le phénoménologue ou (...) l’idéaliste. Le dualisme, qui e... (shrink)